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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a multi—equation multi—variate analysis
of differences in the supply of surgeons and the demand foroperations
across geographical areas of the United States in 1963 and 1970. The
results provide considerable support for the hypothesis thatsurgeons
shift the demand for operations. Other things equal, a 10percent
increase in the surgeon/population ratio results in about a 3percent
increase in per capita utilization. Moreover, differences insupply
seem to have a perverse effect on fees, raising them when the surgeon!
population ratio increases. Surgeon supply is in part determined by
factors unrelated to demand, especially by the attractiveness of the
area as a place to live.
Victor R. Fuchs
National Bureau of Economic Research
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415/326—1927THE SUPPLY OF SURGEONS AND THE DEMAND FOR OPERATIONS
Victor R. Fuchs*
Inequality in the distribution of physicians across the United
States and the possible influence of physician supply on the demand for
their services are subjects of continuing interest to economists and
health policy makers. If physicians choose their locations partly for
reasons unrelated to demand, and, if, given their locations, they can
increase or decrease the demand for their services independently of
changes in price, the implications for economic analysis and for public
policy are profound. Some economists [Fuchs—Kramer 1972; Evans 1974]
have reported evidence in support of the demand—shifting hypothesis,
but others are skeptical [Sloan—Feldman 1977]. Many physicians believe
that they have almost unlimited power to shift demand. This belief is
based on introspection, clinical experience, and the correlation between
supply and utilization, but skeptics offer several alternative explana-
tions for the correlation.
The principal purpose of this paper is to shed some light on
this question through a multi—equation, multi—variate analysis of
differences in the supply of surgeons and the demand for operations
across geographical areas of the United States. In—hospital operations
seem particularly well suited for analysis of demand—shifting because
several of the problems that have hampered previous studies can be
avoided or minimized. The following section discusses the hypothesis
of demand—shifting and indicates why this study provides a good test of
it. The analytical framework and data are then described, followed by
*1 am grateful to Louis Garrison and Natalie Ziegler for research
assistance, to Lawrence J. Lau for econometric advice, and to the par-
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a section reporting the empirical results and a concluding section which
considers some implications.
The "DemandShifting" Hypothesis
Standard economic analysis assumes that the supply and demand
schedules in any market are independent. Given an exogenous increase
in supply, a new equilibrium is reached by moving down the (constant)
demand curve, as shown in Figure lA. The demand—shift hypothesis asserts
that "given an exogenous shift in the supply of physicians from S1 to S2,
the physicians induce a shift in demand from D1 to D2" (see Figure 1B).
Another way of viewing demand—shifting is presented in Figure 2.
The benefits from increases in the quantityof medical care, either to an
individual patient or to a population, can be assumed to increase at a
decreasing rate, hence the falling marginal benefit curve MB. For
simplicity, let us assume that the, cost of medical care to the patient
(financial cost, time costs, risks, etc.) increases at a constant rate,
shown by the marginal cost curve MC. If patients had full information
and full control over the quantity of care, they would choose quantity Q.
The fact that the quantity may be determined by the physician does not
in itself imply demand—shifting. The physician, acting as an unbiased
agent of the patient, may also choose quantity Q. If, however, the
physician chooses and the patient accepts a quantity of care greater
than or less than Q, we would say that there has been demand—shifting.
Note that demand can be shifted either up (to the right) or down
(to the left). Let us assume that, other things equal, physicians
prefer to come as close to Q as possible, i.e., they derive utility from3
ordering the amount of care which equates marginal cost and marginal
benefit for their patients.' Let us also assume that physicians derive
utility from income and that work (at least beyond some level) is a source
of disutility. If the physician/population ratio is relativelyhigh in
an area (for reasons unrelated to demand) they may push quantity to the
right of Q in order to keep prices and incomes from falling drastically.
If there are relatively few physicians in an area, and if theycannot
or do not raise price to an equilibrium level, they may push quantity
to the left of Q in order to avoid excessive work. This latter situation,
sometimes characterized as "excess demand," has been offered as an
explanation for the observed correlation between supply and utilization
[Feldstein 1970]. Itwouldbedescrjbed inFigurelAbya pricewhich is below the
intersectjonofS1anddemand. Ashiftof supply to the right results in
higher utilization because it takes care of some of the excess demand.
Note that the presence of demand—shifting should not be equated
with "unnecessary care." If "necessary care" is defined as Q in Figure2,
demand—shifting to the left implies that some patients are not getting
the care they should, and does not Imply that any patients aregetting
unnecessary care. Moreover, necessary care may be defined differently
than the quantity that maximizes the patient's utility (I.e., Q). If,
for instance, it Is defined as the quantity that maximizes the patient's
health regardless of cost, the optimum would clearly be to theright of Q
and such demand—shifting would not necessarily imply "unnecessary care."
This study of in—hospital operations provides a sharp test of
demand shifting for several reasons. First, operationsare typically
well—defined procedures; it Is, therefore, possible toget a direct
measure of quantIty. There is some variation in average complexity of
operations (as measured by the California Relative Value Scale) across4
geographical areas; the coefficient of variation for 11 frequently per-
formed procedures is 6 percent. A Count of operations, however, is
likely to be a much better measure of quantity of medical care than a
count of office visits, which may vary greatly with respect to length,
number of tests and X—rays, etc. Furthermore, variations in average
complexity can be studied separately.
-A second reason why operations should provide an interesting study of demand
shifting is that we can rule out "excess demand" (1. e. demand shifting to the left)
as an important explanation for any observed relation between supply and utilization.
Excess demand may exist for house calls and other types of services
rendered by general practitioners, where price seems to be below its
equilibrium level and non—price rationing is observed, but such phenomena
are rare in surgery. Economists and physicians who have studied surgical
markets have reported that the average number of operations per surgeon
(150 to 200 per year) is far belowthe level that surgeons consider a
"full workload" (about 400 to 500 per year) [Fuchs, 1969; Hughes, Fuchs,
Jacoby and Lewit, 1972; Watkins, Hughes and Lewit, 1975]. The average
workload is less than half that recorded in group practice settings such
as the Group Health Cooperative (Seattle) and the Mayo Clinic (Rochester,
Minnesota), and below the quantity that surgeons would be willing and
able to perform at the going price. The data used in this paper reveal
that even in non—metropolitan areas where the surgeon/population ratio
is very low, the average surgeon performs only about 250 operations per
year. A recent SOSSUS report noted, "... wehave failed to identify
large or small areas of this country that are significantly under—supplied
with personnel suitably qualified to carry out surgery" [SOSSUS, 19761.5
The "cost of time" explanation is also likely to be less relevant
for operations than for physician office visits. This explanation for
the cofrelation between supply and utilization asserts that equilibrium
is achieved by a change in the total price to the patient, including the
cost of time. Where the physician population is higher, the time costs
to the patient of search, travel, and waiting are all reduced, which is
equivalent to a decline in price. Thus- figure 1A is said to adequately
describe the market for physician services if price is correctly specified.
There is, therefore, no need to introduce demand shifting as an explana-
tion. Time costs are undoubtedly important for the average ambulatory
visit, but are likely to be less relevant for in—hospital operations
because the psychic costs of surgery and the time costs of hospitalization
are likely to be large relative to the time costs of search, travel, and
waiting. Thus, this study avoids an ambiguity Inherent in many previous
studies of demand shifting.
Finally, given widespread insurance coverage for in—hospital
surgery (about 80 percent of the population), the absence of accurate
price data may cause fewer problems than in studies of demand for out-
patient services which have lower Insurance coverage.
Although an inter—area analysis focused on surgical operations seems to
offer several advantages, there are potential problems as well. First, there is
probably a significant amount of "border crossing" by surgical patients. Whereas
most outpatients obtain care fromnearby physicians, it is not unusual for
patients to travel considerable distances for in—hospital surgery. Such
"border crossing" is likely to be particularly relevant for residents of
nonmetropolitan areas who frequently go to metropolitan areas for their6
operations. According to American Hospital Association data (1972), the
rate per thousand population of operations (excluding births) in metro—
politan area hospitals was 1.75 times the rate in nonmetropolitan area
hospitals. Health Interview Survey Data (1970) based on the residence
of the patient rather than thelocationof the hospital, indicates a
(non—obstetrical) operation rate for metro residents only 1.10 times
the rate for nonmetro residents. Using this information plus the metro!
nonmetro population ratio of 2.33, we can calculate that nonmetro residents
obtain about 30 percent of their operations in metro areas (assuming no
movement of metro residents to nonmetro areas for in—hospital surgery).2
Thus, if there is an effect of supply on demand, the demand in nonmetro
areas may be affected by the supply in the adjacent metro area as well
as by the supply in the nonmetro area itself.
There is probably much less unreciprocated border crossing from
one geographical division to another. A comparison of the surgical
utilization rates in the HIS data for 1970 with AHA data for 1972 shows
four divisions (New England, East North Central—East, South Atlantic—
Upper, and Pacific) with rates above the U.S. average for both measures,
and five divisions (East North Central—West, South Atlantic—Lower, East
South Central, West South Central, Mountain) with rates below U.S.
average, according to both measures. There are two divisions (Middle
Atlantic and West North Central) which show rates above the U.S. average
by location of hospital (AHA data), and below U.S. average by residence
(HIS data). This suggests that there may be some unreciprocated border
crossing into those two divisions for surgery. However, it should be
noted that both those divisions had rates above the U.S. average in the7
HIS data for 1963, so it may be that some of the discrepancy in 1970 is
the result of sampling variability.3
Another possible source of difficulty is that a significant
amount of surgery (fragmentary data suggest about 20 percent)4 is per-
formed by physicians who are not "surgical specialists"——primarily
general practitioners and surgical residents. The location of surgical
residents is highly correlated with that of surgeons, but the location
of general practitioners is not, and some attempt will be made to take
account of their supply in the analysis.
Not only are some operations performed by "non—surgeons," but
surgical specialists typically do not limit their practice to performing
operations. Thus, this study is concerned with only a portion (albeit
the major portion) of the demand for "surgeons' services," and would
result in an understatement of "demand shifting" if, as seems likely,
It Is easier and more attractive for surgeons to shift the demand for
office procedures and tests than for in—hospital operations.5
One problem which is perennial in attempts to estimate demand
shifting Is that of simultaneity. Strong demand for surgery in an area
may attract surgeons, rather than the surgeons stimulating demand. I
will attempt to deal with this problem by using "predicted" physician
supply rather than actual supply. The predictions will be based on a
regression that incorporates "taste" variables that affect surgeon
location.8
The Ana 1ytical Framework and Data Base
The general framework of this paper is similar to that used by
Fuchs and Kramer to analyze inter—area variations in the demand for,
and supply of, physicians' services. A demand equation is specified
which includes variables usually thought to determine demand (e.g.,
demographic characteristics, income, price), and then "predicted"
physician supply is added. This predicted supply is obtained by regres-
sing the surgeon/population ratio on a set of variables believed to
determine physician location. The physician location decision is of
interest in its own right, given the wide variation in the physician!
population ratio across areas.
Cross—section regressions are run for 1963 and for 1970 and in
a few instances the observations for the two years are pooled. The
Health Interview Survey (HIS), which is the source for the surgical
utilization data, provides information for 22 areas (metropolitan and
nonmetropolitan areas in each of 11 divisions)6 that cover the entire
population. These areas are the units of observation for some of the
regressions. Other regressions are run on a more detailed breakdown of
the HIS data in which individuals are cross—classified by age (six
classes), sex, race (white and nonwhite), and education of head of
family (five classes), and the 22 areas. Regressions across these cells
permit much finer control of demographic variables and also permit
testing of Pauly's suggestion that demand shifting might be more important
for some groups (e.g., the poorly educated) than for others
The possibility of border crossing from nonmetro to metro areas
is allowed for by including an additional predicted supply variable for9
each of the nonmetro areas. This variable is based on the ratio of the
number of surgeons in the adjacent metro area to the total population
of the division. Also, some regressions are run across only the metro
areas or only the nonmetro areas. Per capita income and surgical prices
are deflated by a general price index for each division, adjusted for
metro—nonmetro differences, and all nominal dollar values for 1963 are
inflated to 1970 price levels.
The utilization rates were calculated from the Health Interview
Survey (for 1963 and 1970) conducted by the National Center for Health
Statistics. The data represent a probability sample of households
including all living civilian noninstitutionalized individuals. In 1970
interviews were conducted with approximately 37,000 households containing
about 116,000 individuals, and in 1963 with 42,000 households containing
134,000 individuals. Surgical rates were obtained in response to the
following questions: "Was the respondent hospitalized at any time during
the last 12 months?" and, if an operation was performed, "What was the
name of the operation?" For each hospitalization, only first operations
were Included; the number of second and third operations was small.
Deliveries, abortions and other obstetrical prQcedures were excluded
from the analysis because they are primarily a function of conception
rates.
Although the Health Interview Survey data are representative of
the nation's population, they are subject to recall error by the indi-
vidual or proxy respondent. Hospitalizations and operations are reported
with greater accuracy than simple episodes of illness, but an overall10
rate of under—reporting of 10 percent remains. Moreover, this under-
reporting is not uniformly distributed among the population. Whites
tend to report hospitalization more accurately than nonwhites; higher
education is also associated with more accurate reporting, as is higher
income (controlling for education).
The physician supply data come from the AMA Distribution of
Physicians in the U.S. and are reasonably accurate. Most of the other
data come from the Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The principal variables (summary statistics in Table 1) are:
End ogenous
Q*Numberof operations per 100,000 population.
S Number of surgical specialists per 100,000 population.
These are office—based patient—care physicians, both board
certified and nonboard—certified. The M.D. supply is adjusted
to take account of doctors of osteopathy.
METS* This variable is used only for the noninetro areas and takes a
value of zero for the metro areas. It is based on the predicted
number of surgeons in the metro area divided by the total
population of the division. It is included to allow for the
possible effect of the surgeon supply in a metro area on the
demand in the nonmetro area in the same division.
Exogenous
INC* Real income per capita (in thousands of dollars).
The income data were obtained from Distribution of Physicians in
the U.S. 1969 data were used for 1970, and 1965 data for 1963.
Nominal per capita income was deflated by a divisional priceI'
index derived by Jeffrey Williamson [1977] from BLS data for large
metro areas.Prices in nonmetro areas were assumed to be .87
of the prices in the metro areas (the cost—of—living differential
reported by the BLS). The all—commodity CPI was used to adjust
for intertemporal change.
IIOTEL* Per capita receipts (dollars per person) of hotels and motels
in the division.The same value was used for the nonmetro and
metro areas in a division. This variable is used as a measure
of the "attractiveness" of the area. The "services" component
of the CPI was used to adjust for intertemporal change.
NONMET A dummy variable denoting nonmnetro areas.
NRNET The fraction of the population in a nonmetroarea living in
counties that were designated as "potential" SMSA's or that had
population in excess of 50,000. This variable took a value of
zero for the metro areas.
%WYTEPercentof the area's population that is white.
GP* Number of general practitioners per 100,000 population.
In addition to the above variables some attempts were made to
use an endogenous price of surgery variable. This was based on American
Medical Association data for nine divisions in 1970reporting the average
price of an initial office visit, a follow—up office visit, and a
follow—up hospital. visit (all for surgeons). An average of these three
prices was calculated and then deflated by the Williamson—BLS divisional
price index for all commodities. The surgical price index never had
any effect in either the demand or location regressions.12
A variable measuring the percent of the division's population
with surgical insurance was also tried without any appreciable effect.
This variable, obtained from the Health Insurance Institute, is probably
not measured accurately.8
In the regressions across the cells, dummy variables are included
for the demographic characteristics——age, sex, race, and education of
head of family——that are used to form the cells.
gressionRe s u 1 ts
Surgeon location. Table 2 presents the results for the surgeon
location regressions.9 Representative runs for each year across the 22
areas are shown. The fits are extremely good (R2 as high as .96) and
the coefficients are relatively insensitive to changes in specification.
The principal conclusion is that the "taste" variables have avery
strong influence on surgeon location.
The NONMET dummy variable is highly significant in all runs with a
value usually close to —25. The preference for metropolitan—like areas
is also revealed by the NRMET variable, with a coefficient of about 14.
This indicates that nonmetro areas with 100 percent of their population
in counties that are nearly like metropolitan counties have, ceteris
paribus, 14 more surgeons per hundred thousand than nonmetropolitan
areas with no population in such counties. The preference of surgeons
for metropolitan living may reflect the professional attraction of the
11medical environment" as well as their preference as consumers. Potential
demand, however, as measured by predicted utilization (Q*)hasvirtually
no effect on location.13
That surgeons live in areas that most people consider desirable
to visit and vacation in is demonstrated by the HOTEL*variable. This
coefficient (usually highly significant) shows the increase associated
with an increase of one dollar per capita in receipts of hotels and
motels. The elasticity at the means is approximately .2.
The coefficient of %WYTE is always positive and usually statis-
tically significant, but varies somewhat depending upon the specifica-
tion. A value of .20 implies an elasticity of .6 at the means. The GP*
coefficient is not significant and does not have any appreciable effect
on those that are. Some attempts were made to incorporate predicted
price into the location regressions. Its coefficient was always
insignificant.
Demand. Table 3 presents the results for the demand regressions
across the 22 areas. Table 4 presents similar runs across the cells.
The latter regressions permit much finer control of the demographic
variables but do not, of course, allow for any additional variation in
those variables which are only available for the areas. The fits of
the demand equations are not as good as those for the surgeon location
equations, and the size and significance of the coefficients are more
sensitive to variations in specification. In general, the results support
the view that an exogenous change in surgeon supply does affect the demand
for operations.Each additional surgeon in an area, ceteris paribus,
is associated with an increase of between 40 and 60 operations per year.
The elasticity at the means for a coefficient of 50 is about .28. Use
of the two—stage procedure does reduce the relation between supply and
utilization. In OLS regressions (shown at the bottom of Table 3), the surgeon
supply coefficient is from 8 to 40 percent larger than in the two—stage runs.14
The regressions in Part B of Table 4 were run across cells with
11 division values instead of 22 area values. The predicted surgeons
were obtained from a regression across the divisions of S* on HOTEL*,
%WYTE and the percent of the division's population living in metropolitan
areas (%NET). The fit was good(R2 =.80)and the coefficient for %MET
(.24) was the equivalent of the NONMET dummy coefficient in the area
location regressions. The relative price of surgery was included in the
cell—division regressions, but was never significant.
The income coefficient is always positive in the demand equations,
but usually not statistically significant unless predicted surgeon supply
is omitted. One surprising finding is the statistically significant
negative coefficient for GP* in 1970. One possible explanation is that
where GP's are numerous they can provide continuing nonsurgical care for
various conditions which might otherwise be treated by surgery. However,
this variable was insignificant in 1963. The coefficients for the demo-
graphic characteristics are presented in Table 5. These are usually very
significant and virtually unaffected by the inclusion or exclusion of the
area variables.
It is possible that the effect of predicted supply on demand
reported in Table 3 and Part A of Table 4 is really the effect of the
metro—noninetro distinction on both supply and demand. To test for this
possibility, similar two—stage regressions were run for just the metro
areas and just the nonmetro areas, with 1963 and 1970 pooled in order
to have a reasonable number of observations.10
The results for the demand regressions across the areas are
reported in Table 6 and those for the regressions across cells in Table 7.15
The principal coefficient of interest is for predicted supply (S*), and
we see that this coefficient is generally larger and more statistically
significant in these regressions than in those that included both metro
and rionmetro areas. For the five metro regressions in the two tables,
the median coefficient for S* is 82, and for the 10 nonmetro regressions
the median is 80. These coefficients imply an elasticity at the means
of approximately .53 for the metro areas and .27 for the nonmetro areas.
The difference in elasticity reflects the much lover surgeon/population
ratio in the nonmetro areas.
The nonmetro regressions were run with an exogenous METS*
variable, as well as without; this coefficient was not statistically
significant. A variable designed to measure the possible impact of
border—crossing in metro •areas also had no significant effect. The only
variable except predicted supply which came close to consistently signifi-
cant results Is GP* in metro areas. The negative coefficient is similar
in size to that reported in Tables 3 and 4 for 1970. In general, the
separate regressions strongly support the demand shift hypothesis and
reject the hypothesis that the mero—nonmetro distinction explains the
observed relation between predicted supply and utilization.
Interaction with education. Mark Pauly has suggested that the
ability of physicians to shift demand for their services might vary for
different groups in the population. In particular, he hypothesized that
the effect might be inversely related to the level of education. Table 8
reports the results of regressions directed to this question. The regres-
sions are run across the cells grouped by education, with 1963 and 1970
pooled. The effect of predicted supply on demand does seem to be largest16
for the low education class and smallest for the high education class.
The differences between the coefficients, however, are not statistically
significant.
Complexity, urgency,_necessity. Eleven frequently performed
procedures11 that account for 42 percent of all nonobstetrical operations
were scaled for "complexity," "urgency," and "necessity." The complexity
scale is based on the California Relative Value Scale. The urgency and
necessity scales are based on replies by physicians to a mailed question-
naire asking them to choose a statement which best characterizes their
impression of the operations being performed in eachcategory.12
Indexes of complexity, urgency and necessity were calculated for
each cell and then regressed on the demographic dummy variables, income
per capita, and predicted surgeon supply, with the results as shown in
Table 9. There seems to be some positive relation between complexity
and surgeon supply, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.
The surgeon supply coefficient in the urgency index regression is large
and statistically significant. Each additional surgeon per 100,000 in
an area lowers the urgency index by one percent——a large change, given
the relatively small variation in the urgency index across areas. The
necessity index also shows an inverse relation with surgeon supply, but
the effect is smaller than for the urgency index and not statistically
significant.
The effect of supply on price. The effect of predicted supply
on quantity (and complexity) provides some evidence in support of the
hypothesis that surgeons shift the demand for their services. Confidence
in this conclusion would be increased if changes in supply also resulted17
in changes in price in the same direction. This question is investigated
with regressions across the 11 divisions.
The surgical price index is derived from AMA data reporting
average fees by specialty and division for initial and follow—up office
visits and follow—up hospital visits in 1970. There is reasonably high
correlation among these different fees.'3 An average of the three types
of fees is taken to be representative Of the relative price of surgery
across divisions. This index is deflated by the Williainson—BLS divisional
price index for all commodities, as shown in Table 10.
The surgical price index in both deflated and undeflated form
is regressed on predicted surgeon supply and predicted demand and on
the observed values of these variables. The predicted values of the
endogenous variables are obtained from regressions with INC*, %MET, HOTEL*,
and GP* as instruments.
The results (Table 11) reveal a positive effect of supply on
price; this is clearly contrary to conventional market behavior. By
contrast, the effect of demand on price is quite small. A coefficient
of 1.5 for supply is equivalent to an elasticity of .5 at the means of
the variables. Inasmuch as predicted price had no effect in the surgeon
supply equation, we can reject the view that the high correlation between
price and surgeon supply14 reflects a causal relation running from price
to supply.18
Discussion and Summary
The small number of observations and potential measurement error
in some of the data require us to regard the results reported in this
paper as less than definitive. In particular, better price data and a
more robust demand specification would serve to increase confidence in
the findings. The shortcomings notwithstanding, the cumulative impact
of the various statistical experiments casts serious doubt concerning the
stability of the demand function for operations when there is an
exogenous shift in the supply of surgeons. The hypothesis that an
increase in the supply of surgeons results in an increase in demand is
strongly supported by the following findings:
1. "Predictedt' supply consistently has a positive effect on
demand in a variety of specifications.
2. The effect is present in both 1970 and 1963 even though the
quantity measure is subject to substantial sampling error and the
correlation between years is not very high.
3. The effect is present and even stronger when metro areas and
nonmetro areas are studied separately.
4. The supply effect on demand is inversely correlated with the
level of education.
5. The supply effect is stronger for procedures deemed less
urgent and less necessary by physicians.
6.Supply has a positive effect on price; not a negative one.
Can these results be reconciled with "normal" market behavior
without recourse to demand shifting? They can, but it takes some straining
to do so. One possible explanation is that surgeon quality is positively19
correlated with the surgeon/population ratio and that higher quality
induces additional demand much as a decrease in price does.15
I agree that quality is probably correlated with quantity, but
it seems doubtful that the quality effect would be strong enough to explain
the observed differences in utilization or price. One indicator of
"quality" is the percentage of surgeons who are sub—specialists, such as
ophthalmologists, orthopedists, and the like, rather than general surgeons.
This percentage is highly correlated with the surgeon/population ratio
across divisions (r =.72),but the elasticity is only .15. Let us assume
this captures only half of the quality difference so that the full
elasticity of quality with respect to S is .3. Let us also assume that
the elasticity of demand with respect to quality is .3 (about triple the
probableelasticity of demand with respect to price). The "quality
effect" would then yield an elasticity of demand with respect to supply
of .09, considerably less than the elasticity actually observed. Further-
more, it should be noted that "better quality" surgeons frequently recom-
mend less surgery than do their colleagues with less training.
I believe that the "stylized facts" revealed in this paper can
be summarized as follows: Surgeons have considerable discretion in choice
of location and their distribution is determined partly by their prefer—
ences as consumers. Thus geographical areas differ in their surgeon/
population ratio for reasons unrelated to the inherent demand for
operations. Wheresurgeonsare more numerous, the demand for operations
increases. Other things equal, a 10 percent higher surgeon/population
ratio results in about a three percent increase in the number of opera-
tions and an increase in price. Thus, the average surgeon's workload20
decreases by seven percent, but income per surgeon declines by much
less.
These findings do leave one troublesome question. If surgeons
can raise prices where they are more numerous, why don't they raise them
even higher where the surgeon/population ratio is lower? One possible
answer is that their incomes are already satisfactory because of their
higher (but not excessively high) workloads, and they have less incentive
to induce additional demand.
The implications for national policy of these results seem striking.
If the surgeon/population ratio should increase (this seems likely if no
action is taken), the result will probably be higher rather than
lower fees, and also more operations. The marginal benefit of these
operations relative to marginal cost is not addressed in this paper, but
recent studies by physicians raise serious doubts, at least for some
procedures [Paradise, et. al 1978; Bunker 1977].
One clear limitation of this study is the omission of that portion
of surgeons' workload unrelated to in—hospital operations. As suggested
previously, the surgeons' ability to shift the demand for out—patient
services is probably greater than for operations. Thus the total impact
of supply on demand may be larger, and the implied difference in income
per surgeon smaller, than that observed in this study. Indeed, while
the weakness of some of the data, and the tentative character of the
conclusions need to be stressed, it should also be noted that some of
these weaknesses probably serve to understate rather than exaggerate the










Q* Operations per 100,00048715558 668567 13.7 10.2
S* Surgeons per 100,000 26.930.5 10.09.5 37.2 31.1
INC* $000 per capita 2•97b335C .36.33 12.1 9.9
HOTEL* Dollars per capita 37.447.3 10.9 15.1 29.1 31.9
NRNET Fraction .139.129 .237 .232 171.2179.8
%WYTE Percent 88.587.8 7.66.6 8.6 7.5






Table 2. Results of surgeon location regressions across areas,
1963 and 1970.
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Note: t statistics in parentheses.
Regressions weighted by population.
indicates predicted value.
astandard error of the regression.23
Table 3. Results of demand regressions across areas, 1963 and 1970.
S.E. METS* INC* %WYTE GP*
1970 407 60 30 230
(3.1) (2.0) (.6)
419 60 30 223 1
(3.0) (1.7) (.5) (.0)
536 753 2
(2.1) (.1)
41? 54 26 263
(2.8) (1.7) (.7)
367a 44 801 —57
(2.4) (2.9) (2.0) (2.5)
1963 523 44 41 768
(1.4) (1.7) (1.4)
539 42 37 705 5





538a 42 43 856 —6
(1.3) (1.7) (1.4) (.3)
Addendum S* METS*
OLS
1970 411 65 34 239
(3.8) (2.4) (.6)
368 55 51 756 —54
(3.4) (3.5) (1.9) (2.3)
1963 520 59 51 633
(2.2) (2.4) (1.2)
535 59 52 676 —4
(2.1) (2.3) (1.2) (.2)
added as an instrument.24
Table 4. Results of demand regressions across cells, 1963 and 1970a
S METS* INC* GP* PRICE
Part A
(area values)
11970 62 27 —83
(3.4) (2.2) (.2)
42 44 633 —68
(2.1) (3.2) (1.4) (2.9)
1963 49 34 300
(2.4) (2.6) (.8)
42 37 550 —18









80 —211 9 (_19)b
(2.1) (.5) (.9)
aAge, sex, race, education dummy variables included;
regression coefficients are presented in Table 5.
b
Elasticities at means.25
Table 5. Regression coefficients of demographic variables in
demand regressions across cells (area values).a
•1970 1963
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Female 710 704 476 475
(4.6) (4.6) (3.7) (3.7)
Age 0—9 —1812 —1801 —1488 —1483
(7.3) (7.3) (7.2) (7.2)
10—19 —2165 —2149 —1917 —1905
(8.8) (8.8) (8.8) (8.8)
35—49 1490 1487 1202 1188
(5.8) (5.9) (5.6) (5.6)
50—64 1290 1291 1291 1273
(4.7) (4.8) (5.5) (5.5)
65+ 2526 2512 1441 1432
(7.9) (7.9) (5.3) (5.3)
Nonwhite —1498 —1542 —1754 —1733
(6.2) (6.4) (8.6) (8.4)
Education 0—8 —627 —472 —673 —510
(2.1) (1.6). (2.5) (1.9)
9—12 162 183 —140 —112
(.6) (.7) (.5) (.4)
15—16 —807 —813 —691 —705
(2.3) (2.3) (2.1) (2.1)
17+ —642 —674 —804 —809
(1.6) (1.7) (2.1) (2.1)
a(1)No other right—hand—side variables.
(2) INC*, S*, METS*, and GP* included as right—hand—side variables.26
Table 6. Results of separate demand regressions across metro areas and
nonmetro areas, 1963 and 1970 pooled.
S.E.S INC* YEAR %WYTE GP* METS*










































































Table 7. Results of demand regressions across cells, separate for
metro areas and nonmetro areas, 1963 and 1970 pooled.















































Table 8. Results of demand regressions across cells by education,
1963 and 1970 pooled.a
* METS* INC* Year




















































aDujnmy variablesfor age, sex, race, and education (where applicable)










Table 9. Results of regressions of indexes of complexity,




















Note: All three indexes were rescaled to have means of 100.
The standard deviations across areas (controlling for




aDulmny variables for age, sex, race, and education included;
coefficients not shown.30
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New England 108.1 107.9 100.2
Middle Atlantic 121.9 107.8 113.1
East North Central 87.5 101.0 86.6
West North Central 86.5 100.2 86.3
South Atlantic 94.2 94.8 99.4
East South Central 83.1 92.6 89.7
West South Central 89.6 91.1 98.4
Mountain 77.8 99.5 78.2
Pacific 111.1 100.9 110.1
Sources:aMerican Medical Association, Profile
1972, pp. 81, 83, 85.
of Medical Practice,
bJeffrey G. Williamson, "Unbalanced Crowth, Inequality and
Regional Development: Some Lessons from American History,"
1977, inimeo, pp. 79—80. Division values are population
weighted means of Williamson's state data.31
Table 11. Regressions of surgical price on supply and demand
across divisions, 1970.
2SLS ____ ____
Deflatedsurgical price 1.47 .01
(1.2) (.3)
Surgical price 1.55 .02
(.9) (.6)
QL S*• 0*
Deflated surgical price 2.01 —.01
(2.7) (.6)




Figure LA. No demand shifting.
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1. For fuller discussions of physician—maximizing behavior, see
Evans (1974), Sloan—Feldman (1977), Reinhardt (1977), and Green (1978).
2. Let
X=numberof operations performed in nonmetro areas
=numberof operations performed on residents of norimetro areas
P =populationof nonmetro areas
XRP=thesame for metro areas. m' m' m
X X R R R=-f—- P=P+P,
P P P. P m n
m n in n
given X =1.75 R =1.10 p =2.33,and assuming that no metro

























3. The coefficient of rank correlation of surgical utilization
(adjusted for demographic characteristics) between 1963 and 1970 across
the divisions is only .42.
4. SOSSUS Summary Report, Table 13, p. 39.
5. In—hospital procedures are typically monitored by hospital
audit committees. Also, such procedures expose the patient to much
greater risk.
6. The East North Central area is divided into an eastern
section (Ohio and Michigan) and a western section (Indiana, Illinois
and Wisconsin). The South Atlantic is divided into an upper section
(Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Virginia, and West Virginia)
and a lower section (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and
Florida).
7. Nevada was excluded because its huge gambling—based receipts
did not seem relevant.
8. The number shown for the Middle Atlantic division is larger
than the division's population.
9. All regressions use population weights.
10. Equality of slope coefficients between 1963 and 1970 was
tested for both S* and Q* regressions and the null hypothesis was not
rejected in any equation.
11. The 11 selected operations are: appendectomy, cataract
removal, cholecystectomy, dilatation and curettage (excluding abortions),
hemorrhoidectomy, hernia repair, hysterectomy, lumbar laminectomy for
disc, prostatectomy, tonsillectomy, and varicose—vein stripping.
12. See Bombardier, Fuchs, Lillard and Warner (1977).V
35
13. The coefficients of rank correlation across the nine divi-
sions are: IOV and FOV .77; IOV and FHV .67; FOV and FHV.90.
14. r.78 for undeflated price, and .71 when the surgical
price Index is deflated by the Williamson—BLS index.
15. This explanation was suggested by Sherwin Rosen.36
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